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Rescuing Dole: Limiting the Intrusion of the
Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations
into the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
THOMAS ALBRIGHT*
INTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of globalization, and the exportation of
industrialization from the United States and other developed nations,
catastrophic disasters causing the deaths of thousands or tens of
thousands have occurred throughout the world. Often, these disasters
spawn litigation that spans the globe and drags on for years, if not
decades. In such litigation, the courts of the United States have been a
favored fighting ground for injured foreign nationals seeking
compensation and justice. However, because "[flederal courts are courts
of limited jurisdiction,"' they have struggled to determine when their
jurisdiction is properly invoked in these cases. In particular, courts have
struggled to respond to a favored litigation strategy of plaintiffs, who file
in the state court where a defendant is domiciled, thereby destroying the
potential for defendants to remove to federal court based on diversity.'
In these circumstances, defendants invariably seek to remove the cases to
federal courts by demonstrating federal question jurisdiction in order to
avail themselves of the federal courts' more lenient standards for
dismissing cases based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.' In
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, May 20o6. The author
would like to thank Professor William Slomanson of the Thomas Jefferson School of Law, without
whose expertise in civil procedure and international law this Note would never have been written. The
author would also like to thank the editors and staff of the Hastings Law Journal for all of their help
and guidance on this Note; it is truly appreciated. All errors are the author's alone.
i. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 51 U.S. 375,377 (1994).
2. See Lumen N. Mulligan, Note, No Longer Safe at Home: Preventing the Misuse of Federal
Common Law of Foreign Relations as a Defense Tactic in Private Transnational Litigation, oo MICH.
L. REV. 2408, 2409-10 (2002). Diversity jurisdiction applies to suits between "citizens of a State and
citizens or subjects of a foreign state." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (2000). However, a resident defendant
may not remove an action in reliance on diversity jurisdiction. Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co., 319 U.S.
448, 452 (1943).
3. Mulligan, supra note 2. Under the definition advanced by the U.S. Supreme Court, "[tihe
principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction
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particular, defendants will often assert federal question jurisdiction based
on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)' and the federal
common law of foreign relations. As federal courts have varied widely in
their analyses of this type of jurisdiction, details regarding the corporate
structure of the defendants or the foreign government itself may have a
major impact on the outcome of a case.
Consider the release of a toxic airborne chemical from an industrial
plant associated with a United States corporation, perhaps in the Middle
East or in Asia. Due to the nature of the chemical and its release, tens of
thousands of people in the immediate vicinity are killed, and hundreds of
thousands are injured. In the aftermath of the disaster, injured persons
and their relatives bring tort actions against the corporation in the
United States, filed in the state courts of its state of incorporation. In
response to these actions, the defendant corporation seeks to remove the
cases to federal court with the ultimate hope of obtaining a forum non
conveniens dismissal.
Because the defendant corporation cannot remove the case to
federal court based on diversity jurisdiction,7 access to the federal court
will depend on a multitude of factors. Under the FSIA, as interpreted by
the Supreme Court in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, the defendant
corporation will be allowed to remove only if a majority of its shares are
directly owned by a foreign government. Therefore, if the foreign
sovereign is only a minority owner, or the owner of a parent corporation
which in turn owns some part, even the majority, of the defendant
corporation, removal under the FSIA will not be allowed.9 So, the
defendant corporation must also attempt to remove the case based on
the federal common law of foreign relations.
Suppose further that the industrial plant at issue produces a product
vital to the economy of the foreign nation, as does an oil refinery. Under
current law, if the case is filed in the Fifth Circuit or the Eleventh Circuit,
it may properly be removed based on the economic interests of that
even when jurisdiction is authorized by... statute." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947)
(emphasis added). Thus, courts may decline to hear a case where "the litigation can more
appropriately be conducted in a foreign tribunal." Id. at 504.
4. 28 U.S.C. §§ 133o(a), i6o2-i6ii (2000).
5. Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795,803 (9th Cir. 2001).
6. This hypothetical scenario is modeled after the infamous 1984 release of methyl isocyanate
from a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, which ultimately resulted in approximately 20,000
deaths and over 200,000 injuries. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 634 F.
Supp. 842, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (discussing the factual background of the Bhopal release).
7. See Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co., 319 U.S. 448, 452 n.7 (1943) (stating that "the defendant must
be a non-resident of the state in which suit is brought before he can remove to the federal court on the
ground of diversity of citizenship").




foreign sovereign. However, if it is filed in the Ninth Circuit, the case
may only be removed if it requires the federal courts to rule on the direct
actions of the foreign sovereign. This circuit split creates major
implications for the outcome of this type of international litigation.
Further, the approach adopted by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits creates
an exception that swallows the Supreme Court holding in Dole. The
direct prohibition on federal question jurisdiction in tiered ownership
situations"0 is essentially rendered meaningless if federal courts can
reanalyze the relationship between the foreign sovereign and the
defendant corporation under the federal common law of foreign
relations and base jurisdiction on "substantial participation" or "vital
economic interests," after finding that jurisdiction does not exist under
the FSIA." However, because the Supreme Court has also endorsed
federal question jurisdiction based on the federal common law of foreign
relations,'2 this doctrine must remain valid, while at the same time
keeping defendants and lower courts from eviscerating Dole.
This Note will attempt to create a framework to eliminate or
minimize the exception to the holding in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson
created by the federal common law of foreign relations. The Supreme
Court has held that ownership by a foreign government must be direct in
order for an instrumentality to qualify for federal question jurisdiction
under the FSIA.'3 Therefore, Part I will introduce and define the
loophole that federal question jurisdiction based on the federal common
law of foreign relations creates within Dole's holding. Part II will discuss
the evolution of federal question jurisdiction based on the FSIA, and the
standards the Court created in Dole. Part III will discuss the current
status of the federal common law of foreign relations, and how it affects
the Court's holding in Dole. Part IV will propose a solution that closes
the loophole created by the federal common law of foreign relations.
I. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
It is a central tenet of international law and international relations
that a sovereign government cannot be made to answer for its actions in
the courts of a foreign nation.'4 This is because "[t]he jurisdiction of the
nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is
susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself."' 5 Further, if the
Io. Id.
i i. Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997).
12. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,427-28 (1964).
13. Dole, 538 U.S. at 480.
14. "[U]pon the principle of comity foreign sovereigns and their public property are held not to
be amenable to suit in our courts without their consent." Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304
U.S. 126, 134 (1938).
15. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, ii U.S. 116, 136 (1812).
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actions of one nation were subject to review in the courts of another,
there would necessarily be an assertion of power by the reviewing nation
and a diminishing of the sovereign power of the other.' 6 "All exceptions,
therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own
territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself."'7
For most of its history, the United States modeled the treatment of
foreign governments within its courts on this extremely limited
approach.'8 Thus, "[flor more than a century and a half, the United States
generally granted foreign sovereigns complete immunity from suit in the
courts of this country."' 9 However, this foreign sovereign immunity has
been recognized as "a matter of grace and comity on the part of the
United States," via the political branches, rather than a constitutional
requirement." So, in making determinations of foreign immunity, the
judiciary has consistently deferred to the positions taken by the political
branches, in particular the executive, on whether to find jurisdiction over
both foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities."
In 1952, the executive branch adopted the "restrictive theory" of
foreign sovereign immunity, wherein a foreign sovereign will not have
immunity in the courts of the United States for its commercial actions."
"Under this theory, immunity is confined to suits involving the foreign
sovereign's public acts, and does not extend to cases arising out of a
foreign state's strictly commercial acts." 3 However, application of this
theory proved difficult for courts, as it was not statutorily defined, and
the courts were forced to rely on "suggestions of immunity" from the
executive branch. 4 This practice led to the assertion of diplomatic
pressures by foreign governments, and, "[o]n occasion, political
considerations led to suggestions of immunity in cases where immunity
would not have been available under the restrictive theory." 5 Further, in
cases where the executive branch did not make specific findings or
recommendations, courts were forced to interpret past suggestions by
that branch as precedent in determining when to allow foreign sovereign
immunity.26 "Thus, sovereign immunity determinations were made in two
16. Id.
17. Id.




22. Id. at 486-87.
23. Id. at 487. This position was adopted by the State Department in a letter from Jack B. Tate,
Acting Legal Adviser to the Department of State, to Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman,
dated May i9, 1952, which is reprinted in 26 Dept. of State Bull. 984-85 (952) and in Alfred Dunhill
of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,711 (1976).





different branches, subject to a variety of factors, sometimes including
diplomatic considerations. Not surprisingly, the governing standards
were neither clear nor uniformly applied."27
In 1976, Congress enacted the FSIA to remedy this situation.28 The
purpose of the FSIA is to "free the Government from... case-by-case
diplomatic pressures," clarify standards courts are to apply in
determining sovereign immunity, and assure litigants of procedural and
substantive due process. 9 "To accomplish these objectives, the [FSIA]
contains a comprehensive set of legal standards governing claims of
immunity in every civil action against a foreign state or its political
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities," as well as exceptions to that
immunity. 0
Section 1604 of the FSIA provides that "a foreign state shall be
immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of
the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter."'"
These stated exceptions include actions in which the foreign state has
waived its immunity, either explicitly or impliedly," and actions that are
based upon commercial activities that either take place within the United
States or cause a direct effect in the United States.33 When one of these
exceptions applies, "the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances. 34 The FSIA also provides a jurisdictional element,
whereby "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction.., of any
nonjury civil action against a foreign state.., as to any claim for relief in
personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to
immunity under sections 1605-i607 of this title."35 In addition, the FSIA
expressly provides that its standards are controlling in both "the courts of
the United States and of the States, ' ,, 6 and "thus clearly contemplates
that such suits may be brought in either federal or state courts.
3 7
However, "'[in] view of the potential sensitivity of actions against foreign
states and the importance of developing a uniform body of law in this
area,' the [FSIA, in 28 U.S.C. section 1441(d)] guarantees foreign states
the right to remove any civil action from a state court to a federal
27. Id. at 488.
28. 28 U.S.C. §§ 133o(a), 1602-1611 (2000).
29. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488.
30. Id.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
32. Id. § i6o5(a)(I).
33. Id. § 16o5(a)(2).
34. Id. § i6o6.
35. Id. § 133o(a).
36. Id. § 1604.




Even after the enactment of the FSIA, courts still had difficulties in
determining when the activities of a foreign government were
commercial and thus not entitled to immunity.39 Related to this issue, it
proved even more difficult for courts to determine when
instrumentalities of those governments were entitled to the protections
of the FSIA. Thus, a circuit split developed within the federal appellate
courts over the degree of ownership a foreign government was required
to hold in a subsidiary corporation in order for that subsidiary to be
properly considered an instrumentality of the state, and therefore
entitled to utilize the removal provisions of section 1441 (d).4
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits developed a "tiered ownership"
approach in holding "that an entity that is owned by an agency or
instrumentality is [also] an agency or instrumentality because it is owned
by a 'foreign state,' [therefore] allowing subsidiaries of state-owned
corporations to come within the Act's protection by virtue of indirect, or
'tiered,' ownership by the actual foreign state."'" The Ninth Circuit, in a
more narrow interpretation, held that "'foreign state' clearly refers to
foreign states themselves, not their controlled corporations, thus 'limiting
an instrumentality to the first tier of ownership: those entities owned
directly by the foreign state itself or by a political subdivision."'" In
resolving the circuit split, the Supreme Court turned to corporate law to
affirm the position of the Ninth Circuit and hold that "only direct
ownership of a majority of shares by the foreign state satisfies the
statutory requirement."43
A basic tenet of American corporate law is that the corporation and its
shareholders are distinct entities .... An individual shareholder, by
virtue of his ownership of shares, does not own the corporation's assets
and, as a result, does not own subsidiary corporations in which the
corporation holds an interest .... A corporate parent which owns the
shares of a subsidiary does not, for that reason alone, own or have legal
title to the assets of the subsidiary; and, it follows with even greater
force, the parent does not own or have legal title to the subsidiaries of
the subsidiary.... The fact that the shareholder is a foreign state does
not change the analysis.'
Therefore, "[a] corporation is an instrumentality of a foreign state under
the FSIA only if the foreign state itself owns a majority of the
38. Id. (quoting H. R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 32 (976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 66o4, 6631).
39. See generally Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349,357-62 (1993).
40. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 480 (2003); see In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun,
Austria on November ii, 2000, 198 F. Supp. 2d 420, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
41. In re Ski Train Fire, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 424.
42. Id. at 424-25 (quoting Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 25i F.3d 795, 8o7 (9th Cir. 2001)).
43. Dole, 538 U.S. at 474-77.
44. Id. at 475-76 (emphasis added).
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corporation's shares."45 And, under section i44i, the corporation will be
able to assert federal question jurisdiction and remove an action to
federal court only where it is an instrumentality of the foreign state,
which requires direct ownership of a majority share by the foreign state.
However, this holding is undermined by the current circuit split
regarding the federal common law of foreign relations. Currently in three
circuits, subsidiaries that are now expressly disqualified as
instrumentalities of a foreign state for purposes of the FSIA may still
remove claims to federal courts by asserting federal question jurisdiction
based on the federal common law of foreign relations.46 Further,
analogous to the overruled "tiered approach," this federal question can
be asserted by showing a sufficient ownership and economic interest in
the subsidiary by a foreign government. 7
II. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION BASED ON THE FEDERAL
COMMON LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
A. BASICS OF FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
The original basis of federal question jurisdiction is the U.S.
Constitution.,8 "The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and
equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made... under their authority; ... and between a State, or
the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects."'49 Under this
provision, federal question jurisdiction is to be interpreted broadly, in
favor of granting jurisdiction to the federal courts rather than the state
courts. "[W]hen a question to which the judicial power... is extended by
the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the
power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause,
although other questions of fact or of law may be involved in it."50
However, federal question jurisdiction has been limited by Congress
since the enactment of the Constitution.5 Today, "[t]he district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 2 In addition, this
45. Id. at 477.
46. See de Perez v. AT&T, 139 F.3d 1368, 1367-77 (iith Cir. 1997); Torres v. S. Peru Copper
Corp., 113 F.3 d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1997); Phil. v. Marcos, 8o6 F.2d 344, 352-53 (2d Cir. 1986). For
example, if State X owned ninety percent of the shares of Corporation A, which in turn owned ninety
percent of the shares of Corporation B, Corporation B would not be an instrumentality of State X
under the FSIA, but could be under the federal common law of foreign relations.
47. See de Perez, 139 F.3 d at 1377-78; Torres, 113 F.3d at 543; Marcos, 8o6 F.2d at 353-54.
48. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. I.
49. Id.
50. Osborn v. President, Dirs. & Co. of Bank, 22 U.S. 738,823 (1824).




congressional limitation on federal question jurisdiction is to be
interpreted as limiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts where there
are jurisdictional issues that overlap with the state courts. This is known
as the "well-pled complaint" rule, such that "a suit arises under the
Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff's
statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon those
laws or that Constitution.""
Finally, although the jurisdiction of the federal courts is thus limited,
plaintiffs may not defeat federal jurisdiction by disguising the federal
claims within their complaint.
An action may "arise under" a law of the United States if the plaintiff's
right to relief necessarily turns on construction of federal law ....
Although the plaintiff is generally considered the "master of his
complaint" and is free to choose the forum for his action, this principle
is not without limitation. A plaintiff will not be allowed to conceal the
true nature of a complaint through "artful pleading."54
B. ARISING UNDER LAWS, TREATIES, AND CONSTITUTION
In most instances, a determination of what is meant by the term "the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States" is relatively
straightforward.55 Generally, this will mean a direct application of federal
law, such as where a federal statute specifically creates or authorizes
jurisdiction-for example, 28 U.S.C. section 144I(d). 6 However, in
certain areas stare decisis dictates that federal common law must be
applied. 7 For example, the constitutional holdings of the United States
Supreme Court can be considered federal common law, as all other
courts are bound by these decisions. Thus, while the Court has asserted
that "[t]here is no federal general common law,''5.there must necessarily
be federal common law in certain arenas.
[The United States Supreme] Court has.., held that a few areas,
involving "uniquely federal interests," are so committed by the
Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control that state
law is pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a
content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts-
so-called "federal common law."59
For example, "obligations to and rights of the United States under its
53. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (i9o8) (emphasis added).
54. Bright v. Bechtel Petroleum, Inc., 780 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Schroeder v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 702 F.2d 189, 191 (9th Cir. 1983)).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (200o).
56. Id. § i441(d) ("Any civil action brought in a State court against a foreign state ... may be
removed by the foreign state to the district court.").
57. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) ("[Tlhe Court did not
have rules like the act of state doctrine in mind when it decided Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins.").
58. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
59. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500,504 (1988).
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contracts are governed exclusively by federal law."'" In addition,
interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements, 6' evidentiary
privileges in federal question cases,6' Native American rights,63 and
"disputes between States concerning their rights to use the water of an
interstate stream ', 6' are all areas that fall under federal common law.
And, most importantly to this Note, "[t]he Supreme Court has held that
the area of international relations is governed exclusively by federal
law."
65
C. FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
While it has never been clearly defined by the Supreme Court, the
existence of the federal common law of foreign relations has been
recognized by the Court.66 "[A]n issue concerned with a basic choice
regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National
Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the
international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of
federal law. ' The rationale behind requiring that decisions affecting
foreign relations be made at the federal level is to avoid discrepancies in
the treatment of foreign sovereigns by different states, as "[r]ules of
international law should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial
state interpretations." ' Further, the federal common law of foreign
relations has been clearly defined by the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. "A cause of action arises under federal law if the
dispositive issues stated in the complaint require the application of
federal common law. The word 'laws' in [28 U.S.C. section] 1331 should
be construed to include laws created by federal judicial decisions as well
as by congressional legislation."
69
D. TREATMENT BY FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS
Under the precedent established by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Banco Nacional v. Sabbatino, various federal circuit courts have
struggled to define exactly when the federal common law of foreign
relations will allow federal question jurisdiction in accordance with the
well-pled complaint rule.7" The Second Circuit was the first appellate
6o. Id.
61. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
62. FED. R. EVID. 501.
63. U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. i93 (2004).
64. Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56,74 (2003).
65. De Perez v. AT&T, 139 F.3 d 1368, 1376-77 (1ith Cir. 1997).
66. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Philippines v. Marcos, 8o6 F.2d 344,353 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting Ivy Broad. Co. v. AT&T Co.,
391 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1968)).
70. Aquafaith Shipping, Ltd. v. Jarillas, 963 F.2d 806,808-09 (5th Cir. 1992).
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court to attempt to define the limits on this type of jurisdiction in
Philippines v. Marcos.7
In Marcos, the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint in state
court seeking a preliminary injunction prohibiting the sale of certain New
York real estate alleged to be beneficially owned by the defendants, the
former president of the Republic and his wife.72 Based on the extreme
importance of the case to the government of the Republic of the
Philippines, the court held that "[i]ssues involving 'our relationships with
other members of the international community must be treated
exclusively as an aspect of federal law."' 73 Further, the court held that:
[F]ederal jurisdiction is present in any event because the claim raises,
as a necessary element, the question whether to honor the request of a
foreign government that the American courts enforce the foreign
government's directives .... The question whether to honor such a
request by a foreign government is itself a federal question to be
decided with uniformity as a matter of federal law, and not separately
in each state.., regardless of whether the overall claim is viewed as
one of federal or state common law."
Thus, at a minimum, claims brought by foreign governments will be
considered requests from that government requiring a decision by the
U.S. government, and will confer federal question jurisdiction to the
federal courts within the Second Circuit based on the federal common
law of foreign relations. 5
After Marcos, the Fifth Circuit was the next appellate court to
consider the issue of federal question jurisdiction based on the federal
common law of foreign relations.' In Torres v. SPCC, after being harmed
by sulfur dioxide emissions from a smelting and refining plant, Peruvian
citizens filed a state court action against the controlling corporations
alleging various state law tort claims.77 The defendant corporations
removed to federal court 8 The district court denied the Peruvian
citizens' motion to remand the action to state court and dismissed the
action, after which the Peruvian plaintiffs appealed.79 The appellate court
found that the district court had jurisdiction to hear the case because
although the plaintiffs asserted only state law tort claims, the complaint
implicated important foreign policy concerns as the action struck at
71. Marcos, 8o6 F.2d at 353.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 352 (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,425 (1964)).
74. Id. at 354.
75. See id.
76. See Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997).
77. Id. at 541.
78. Id. at 540-41.
79. Id. at 542.
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Peru's vital economic and sovereign interests.8°
The court articulated several principles to support its analysis. First,
"[t]he Supreme Court has authorized the creation of federal common law
in the area of foreign relations."' Second, "[tihe mining industry in Peru,
of which SPCC is the largest company, is critical to that country's
economy, contributing up to 50% of its export income and ii% of its
gross domestic product. Furthermore, the Peruvian government has
participated substantially in the activities for which SPCC is being
sued."2 Therefore, the court wrote:
This action ... strikes not only at vital economic interests but also at
Peru's sovereign interests by seeking damages for activities and
policies in which the government actively has been engaged. On the
record before us, we must conclude that the plaintiffs' complaint raises
substantial questions of federal common law by implicating important
foreign policy concerns."
Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that in addition to
claims brought as requests by foreign governments, suits that were
brought against foreign industries determined to be "vital economic
interests" and where foreign governments "participated substantially" in
that industry, would be subject to the federal common law of foreign
relations.
84
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was the next court to
consider this area of law.8' In de Perez v. AT&T, foreign individuals
injured by a gas pipeline explosion in Venezuela brought multiple suits in
Georgia state courts alleging state law causes of action.86 The defendants
removed the cases to the federal district court.8' The district court
consolidated the cases, denied plaintiffs' motion to remand to state court,
and ultimately dismissed the actions on forum non conveniens grounds."8
As the basis for their removal actions, the defendants relied on Torres to
claim that the district court had federal question jurisdiction based on the
federal common law of foreign relations."' However, in reversing the
actions of the district court, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district
court should have remanded the cases because it did not in fact have
federal question jurisdiction.'
so. Id. at 543.
8I. Id. at 542 n.7.
82. Id. at 543.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. De Perez v. AT&T, 139 F.3 d 1368 (i ith Cir. 1997).




90. Id. at 1372.
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The court based its decision on an analysis of the case at issue
utilizing the standards set out in Torres by the Fifth Circuit.9 "The cases
addressing this area of federal common law generally involve disputes in
which a foreign government, or its instrumentality, is a named party to
the lawsuit, or where the actions of a foreign government are a direct
focus of the litigation."9 However, "[t]he Fifth Circuit has extended the
area of federal jurisdiction based on the federal common law of foreign
relations to disputes between private parties that implicate the 'vital
economic and sovereign interests' of the nation where the parties'
dispute arose. '
Here, the Eleventh Circuit clearly set forth the appropriate factors
for analyzing federal question jurisdiction based on the federal common
law of foreign relations.94 The factors in this jurisdictional inquiry include
whether: (i) "the injuries occurred on foreign soil," (2) "the
government's policy decisions or actions are brought into question by the
suit," (3) "the foreign government was involved in the alleged
wrongdoing," and (4) "the action strikes at the heart of the economic and
sovereign interests of the foreign nation."'9
After applying these four factors, the Eleventh Circuit held that "the
evidence regarding Venezuela's interest in the plaintiffs' action is too
speculative and tenuous to confer federal jurisdiction over this case....
Although this litigation might significantly affect AT&T's business
operations in Venezuela, it is not clear that the lawsuit threatens the
economic vitality of Venezuela itself. '" 6 However, while it applied the
Torres factors to the case, the Eleventh Circuit seemed to reject the Fifth
Circuit's conclusion that a complaint that indirectly alleges involvement
of the foreign government will meet the standard for federal question
jurisdiction required by the well-pled complaint rule.97
[W]e think it significant, for purposes of this case, that the Venezuelan
government has taken no position on whether this lawsuit proceeds in
the United States or in Venezuela. Without such an indication from the
foreign nation, we are reluctant to find that the plaintiffs' private cause
of action sounding in Georgia tort law implicates important foreign
policy on the face of the plaintiffs' pleadings. It seems more likely to us
that any issues involving the participation of the Venezuelan
government, or its corporate entities, will arise in the form of a defense
by AT&T. Federal question jurisdiction, however, cannot be based
9i. Id.
92. Id. at 1377.
93. Id. (quoting Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 543 n.8 (5th Cir. 1997)).
94- Id.
95. Id.




upon a federal defense.f
The final appellate court to consider the issue of federal question
jurisdiction based on the federal common law of foreign relations was the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit." In Patrickson v. Dole Food Co.,
Latin American workers brought a class action suit against multinational
fruit and chemical companies who allegedly exposed the workers to a
toxic pesticide."° This suit was filed in Hawaiian state court, and was
removed by the defendants in reliance on Philippines v. Marcos."°' The
district court then denied the plaintiffs' motion for remand and dismissed
the case based on forum non conveniens."12 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
held that federal question jurisdiction did not exist, given that the case, as
framed by the plaintiffs, did not require the evaluation of any act of state
or the application of any principle of international law. 3
Thus, in Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., the Ninth Circuit limited the
application of the federal common law of foreign relations to cases in
which acts of state by a foreign government are in question, or when
violations of international law are alleged in the complaint. 4 Further, in
its opinion, the Ninth Circuit criticized the holdings of the other
appellate courts, particularly the Second Circuit in Philippines v.
Marcos.°5
Marcos ... broadly suggest[s] that federal-question jurisdiction could
"probably" be premised on the fact that a case may affect our nation's
foreign relations, whether or not federal law is raised by the plaintiff's
complaint: "[A]n action brought by a foreign government against its
former head of state arises under federal common law because of the
necessary implications of such an action for United States foreign
relations." This reads far too much into Sabbatino.16
Determining that Congress had not specifically extended federal
question jurisdiction to all cases in which the federal common law of
foreign relations might become an issue, the court interpreted this as
congressional silence where it could have acted, and strictly interpreted
the well-pled complaint rule."° "We therefore decline to follow Marcos,
Torres, and de Perez insofar as they stand for the proposition that the
federal courts may assert jurisdiction over a case simply because a
98. Id.
99. Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2ooi).
ioo. The pesticide was dibromochloropropane, or DBCP, which was banned for general use in the




lO4. Id. at 803.
1o5. Id. at 801-02.
io6. Id. (quoting Phil. v. Marcos, 8o6 F.2d 344, 354 (2d Cir. 1986)).
107. Id. at 803.
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foreign government has expressed a special interest in the outcome.
'' 18
III. NORMATIVE APPROACH TO FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
BASED ON THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS IN
LIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT HOLDING IN DOLE
The Supreme Court has not expressly considered the federal
common law of foreign relations since Sabbatino, despite a clear
opportunity to do so in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson. Thus, the circuit
courts currently have different standards for determining when claims
will create federal question jurisdiction per the federal common law of
foreign relations. However, in order to avoid undermining the decision of
the Supreme Court in Dole, this type of jurisdiction must be available
only in limited circumstances. This is due to the overlap in substantive
law between the FSIA and the federal common law of foreign relations.
Defendants in transnational litigation will often assert federal question
jurisdiction based upon both the FSIA and the federal common law of
foreign relations, with the determination of jurisdiction on each claim
dependent upon a number of overlapping or similar factors. Therefore,
use of the federal common law of foreign relations to grant federal
question jurisdiction- where the federal common law of foreign relations
is interpreted broadly, as in the approach by the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits-has the potential to undermine the holding of the Supreme
Court in Dole.
As discussed previously, in Dole, the Court held that federal
question jurisdiction under sections 133o and 1441 of the FSIA is limited
to situations in which a foreign government has a direct ownership in a
corporation, which can then be considered an instrumentality of a
foreign state.'" In other words, based upon this ruling the foreign
government must have a direct and immediate interest in the outcome of
the litigation. Therefore, allowing federal question jurisdiction to be
based on activities in which the foreign government has "participated
substantially" or that implicate "vital economic interests" under the
federal common law of foreign relations as adopted by the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits creates an opportunity for defendant corporations to
avoid being bound by the holding in Dole, contrary to the intent of
Congress in enacting the FSIA. However, as the Supreme Court
recognized the validity of the federal common law of foreign relations in
Sabbatino,"' the limitations on this basis of federal question jurisdiction
cannot be so restrictive as to effectively eliminate it."'
Io8. Id.
to9. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 473 (2003).
i o. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
iii. Other commentators have taken the position that there should be little or no allowance of
federal question jurisdiction based solely on the federal common law of foreign relations. See Andrew
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After analysis of the different approaches to federal question
jurisdiction based on the federal common law of foreign relations, there
remains the task of creating an overall approach to the issue that can be
used by all federal courts. This normative approach to the application of
the federal common law of foreign relations must begin with the basic
elements that each court to consider the issue has agreed will establish
federal question jurisdiction. Additionally, this overall approach must be
based on the underlying purposes of the doctrine, while remaining
consistent with both the purposes of the FSIA and the limitations of
Dole.
A. LAWSUITS BROUGHT By FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS
The first such basis must be where a lawsuit is brought directly by a
foreign sovereign. By filing suit within the United States, a foreign nation
asserts that its interests are implicated, and Congress has determined that
federal courts are the proper jurisdictions for these actions.' 2 Therefore,
"the text and structure of the FSIA demonstrate Congress' intention that
the FSIA be the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state
in our courts.. ' ..3 Because the FSIA is directly applicable in these
situations, the federal common law of foreign relations will not be
reached by courts in determining jurisdiction. But, federal question
jurisdiction must attach in these situations, and so the plaintiff foreign
sovereign will have access to the federal courts.
B. LAWSUITS IMPLICATING THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The second basis will be a lawsuit that necessarily implicates the Act
of State doctrine,"4 such that ruling on the case will require courts to pass
judgment upon the acts of a foreign sovereign within its own borders.
Where the "complaint turns on the validity or invalidity of any act of a
foreign state," federal question jurisdiction based on the federal common
law of foreign relations must attach."' Further, "the scope of the act of
state doctrine must be determined according to federal law." 6 The cases
discussed demonstrate the key reason for the existence of the federal
common law of foreign relations: the necessity for uniformity in the
C. Baak, COMMENTS: The Illegitimacy.of Protective Jurisdiction over Foreign Affairs, 70 U. CMI. L.
REV. 1487, 1488 (2003) (arguing that the federal common law of foreign relations is an example of
"protective jurisdiction").
112. 28 U.S.C. § 133o(a) (2ooo).
113. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428,434 (1989).
114. See Baak, supra note iii, at 1492-94 (discussing the Act of State doctrine).
I15. Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 799-8oo (9th Cir. 2001).
116. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964). "[A]n issue concerned with a
basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in
ordering our relationships with other members of the international community must be treated
exclusively as an aspect of federal law." Id. at 425.
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actions of the United States regarding foreign affairs. Therefore, each
appellate court to consider the issue has determined that the Act of State
doctrine is a valid means of basing federal question jurisdiction on the
federal common law of foreign relations."7 Where a court is required to
consider the direct actions of a foreign sovereign, federal question
jurisdiction must attach.
C. INTERNATIONAL LAW VIOLATIONS
The third basis for establishing federal question jurisdiction based on
the federal common law of foreign relations will be where violations of
international law are alleged on the face of the complaint. The Ninth
Circuit, in Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., the most limited interpretation
of the federal common law of foreign relations, suggests that where the
complaint requires the application of principles of international law,
federal question jurisdiction will attach." Because these complaints raise
the same foreign policy concerns as the Act of State doctrine, where the
United States must speak with one voice in making determinations of
international law, federal question jurisdiction will attach in these cases.
Each appellate court to consider the issue has reached a consensus
that lawsuits brought by foreign governments, lawsuits implicating the
Act of State doctrine, and lawsuits alleging violations of international law
are valid means for federal question jurisdiction to attach based upon the
federal common law of foreign relations."9 In addition, each of these
means of demonstrating jurisdiction is consistent with the holdings of the
Supreme Court in both Sabbatino and Dole, as well as Congress's
purpose in enacting the FSIA.
D. HYBRID APPROACH TO ACTIVITIES IN WHICH A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
HAS A SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST
Finally, and most importantly based on the circuit split that has
formed around this issue, lawsuits that are brought directly against an
entity controlled by or closely related to a foreign government must be
considered, and a determination of the threshold at which federal
question jurisdiction will attach must be made. 20 This use of the federal
common law of foreign relations must also be consistent with both the
holding of the Supreme Court in Dole and the congressional purposes
behind the FSIA. In addition, this approach must comply with the well-
117. See Patrickson, 251 F.3 d 795; de Perez v. AT&T, 139 F.3 d 1368 (ilth Cir. 1997); Torres v. S.
Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997); Phil. v. Marcos, 8o6 F.2d 344,353 (2d Cit. 1986).
118. Patrickson, 251 F.3 d at 8oo.
119. See supra Part n.
120. See Lumen N. Mulligan, Note, No Longer Safe at Home: Preventing the Misuse of Federal
Common Law of Foreign Relations as a Defense Tactic in Private Transnational Litigation, too MICH.
L. REV. 2408, 2440-41 (2002) (arguing that only direct conduct of a foreign sovereign is sufficient to
implicate the federal common law of foreign relations).
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pled complaint rule in regards to economic interests of the foreign
nation.
Therefore, a hybrid approach to federal question jurisdiction based
on the federal common law of foreign relations appears to provide the
optimal method for determining when this type of jurisdiction should
attach. First, federal question jurisdiction based on the federal common
law of foreign relations should attach where the actions of a corporation
directly owned by a foreign sovereign are at issue, under the same
analysis required for jurisdiction under the FSIA per Dole.'2 I Second,
where a foreign sovereign substantially and effectively controls the
actions of a corporation, either through tiered ownership,22 substantial
minority ownership, or a sufficiently close relationship to demonstrate an
exertion of control by the sovereign,'23 federal question jurisdiction based
on the federal common law of foreign relations should be allowed where
the complaint also truly implicates vital economic interests of the foreign
nation. This approach will ensure that the holding of the Supreme Court
in Dole is not undermined, or simply bypassed, with an expansive use of
the federal common law of foreign relations, yet also ensures that
lawsuits where the vital economic interests of a nation are at issue, and
that genuinely implicate the foreign relations of the United States, are
heard in the federal courts in accordance with the Court's holding in
Sabbatino. In addition, this approach emphasizes the "discretion" that
federal judges have in determining federal question jurisdiction after
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson.'24 Further, this approach
addresses criticisms of Dole that requiring direct ownership does not
recognize ownership and control practices in foreign nations, and will
require reorganization by foreign corporations solely to comply with the
holding.'5 Thus, by requiring that the foreign sovereign have control over
the corporation seeking federal question jurisdiction, and that the vital
economic interests of that sovereign be affected, federal question
jurisdiction based on the federal common law of foreign relations will be
limited to situations where either the commercial actions of a sovereign
are at issue, or the commercial well-being of a sovereign is at issue. This
limited application is consistent with both the purposes of the federal
121. Dole requires that the foreign government have a direct ownership interest in a majority of
the corporate shares in order for the jurisdictional elements of the FSIA to be applicable. Dole Food
Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 474 (2003).
122. See supra note 46 for a tiered ownership structure that would be significant under this hybrid
approach to federal common law of foreign relations jurisdiction.
123. For example, such control may be demonstrated by the internal national laws of the foreign
sovereign.
124. 478 U.S. 804 (1986). For an in-depth discussion of this principle of discretion and its evolution
since Merrell Dow, see Note, Mr. Smith Goes to Federal Court: Federal Question Jurisdiction Over
State Law Claims Post Merrell Dow, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2272 (2002).
125. Dole, 538 U.S. at 485 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting in part).
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common law of foreign relations, as well as the restrictive nature of FSIA
jurisdiction per Supreme Court's holding in Dole.
CONCLUSION
The federal common law of foreign relations is a valid means of
creating federal question jurisdiction. However, the current application
of this doctrine within the federal courts is highly variable from circuit to
circuit, and the approach adopted by the majority of the courts that have
considered the issue is inconsistent with the holding of the Supreme
Court in Dole. Therefore, an approach that consolidates the positive
aspects of each approach, reconciles the federal common law of foreign
relations with the FSIA as interpreted in Dole, and is consistent with the
congressional purpose in limiting and controlling the case load within the
federal courts must be created. Therefore, courts should grant federal
question jurisdiction based on the federal common law of foreign
relations via application of a hybrid theory, requiring foreign
governments to have a substantial, but not majority, ownership interest
in any subsidiary, in addition to a vital economic interest in the outcome
of the case.
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